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Legislative Reform of U.S. Extradition
Statutes: Plugging The Terrorist's
Loophole
WILLIAM M. HANNAY*

The United States has been in the forefront of those nations advocating mandatory extradition or prosecution of terrorists, the concept embodied in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft' and in other multilateral agreements. Flaws in our own extradition
procedures, however, make it difficult for us to practice what we preach.
Indeed, recent U.S. court rulings have appeared to put the imprimatur of
our judicial system on the violent acts of terrorists who have no respect
for human life, for democratic process or for the Rule of Law. Extradition
procedures that allow such dangerous precedents must be reformed as an
essential step in improving U.S. antiterrorism efforts.
Legislation was almost enacted during the second session of the 97th
Congress that would have recodified and modernized all U.S. extradition
procedures. The Senate version of this legislation (S. 1940) was developed
over a two-year period in cooperation with the Departments of State and
Justice and was passed by the Senate with amendments in August of
1982.2 In June of 1982, the House Judiciary Committee reported out its
own version of the legislation, which was also based in large part on the
executive branch's recommendations.' Many of the proposed changes in
* William M. Hannay is a member of the firm of Schiff, Hardin & Waite of Chicago,
Illinois and an adjunct instructor at IIT/ChicagoKent College of Law.
1. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done Dec. 16, 1970,
entered into force Oct. 14, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
2. S. 1940 was first introduced by Senator Strom Thurmond, chairman of the Judiciary
Committee, on December 11, 1981 after hearings. See ExtraditionAct of 1981: Hearings on
S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess. 334 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Sen. Hearings].The text of the earlier bill (S. 1639), correspondence
from the Departments of State and Justice, and a detailed Memorandum on Extradition

Legislation were published in the Congressional Record. See 127 CONG. REc. 89952 (1981).
Some changes were made in the "political offense" provisions of S. 1940 by the Senate Judiciary Committee in April of 1982. See also Amendments to Title 18 of the United States
Code Relating to International Extradition, S. REP. No. 331, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2638
(1982) [hereinafter cited as S. RaP. 331]. A different approach to the "political offense"
determination, fundamentally changing the Judiciary Committee's approach, was recommended by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in June of 1982. See Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, Extradition Act of 1981, S. REP. No. 475, 97TH Cong., 2d Sess. 79
(1982) (adopted on the floor of the Senate without debate on Aug. 19, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 475). See also 128 CONG. REc. 810,884 (1982).
3. H.R. 5227 was introduced by Representative William J. Hughes, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee on December 15, 1981. See 127
CONG. REc. E5877 (1981). The bill was subsequently reintroduced as H.R. 6046 on April 1,

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 13:1

the existing statutory scheme were similar in both the House and Senate
versions.4 There were, however, significant differences in the two versions
with respect to the "political offense" exception to extradition treaties.
The controversy surrounding the varying approaches to the "political offense" issue effectively prevented floor action in the House. Thus, it remains for the 98th Congress to consider resubmitted extradition reform
legislation.
I.

BACKGROUND TO THE "POLITICAL OFFENSE" ISSUE

Extradition treaties universally contain a list of enumerated offenses
for which extradition is authorized. Extradition treaties of the United
States, like those of virtually all other nations, also incorporate an exception or exclusion prohibiting extradition in two circumstances related to
politics: (1) where the offense for which extradition is requested is a "political offense" and (2) where the extradition request is politically motivated, even though the offense charged is not itself a "political offense."
Typical of the language of such an exclusion is that in the extradition
treaty between Great Britain and the United States, which states:

1982 after the Subcommittee on Crime approved an amendment in the nature of a substitute and reported it as such to the House Judiciary Committee. The full committee ordered
H.R. 6046 favorably reported on May 18, 1982; the accompanying report was printed on
June 24, 1982. See HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, EXTRADITION ACT OF 1982, H.R. RP.
No. 627, Pt. 1, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as H. Rep. 627, Pt. 1]. The bill
was sequentially referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which recommended passage on July 29, 1982 and reported it on August 3, 1982. See H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 2, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter cited as H. Rep. 627, Pt. 2]. The House took no further
action upon the bill. 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 34,519 (1981-82).
4. Section 3195 of both the House and Senate versions would correct a long-standing
anomaly in extradition by creating a right of appeal for the government as well as the person faced with the extradition. Traditionally, the defendant could seek appellate review by
habeas corpus, but the government had no means of review at all. Another curious procedural practice would also be changed in both versions. Under current law, extradition requests are heard by U.S. magistrates. Under § 3194(0(1) of both the House and Senate
versions, either party can have the political offense issue heard by a district judge instead of
a magistrate due to the importance and complexity of that issue.
Other major changes in extradition procedures contained in S. 1940 include the following (the corresponding provisions of H.R. 6046 are noted in parentheses): § 3193 (§ 3191)
rco-uizes tha1t a U.S. ubigatiun
e -x0adi parucuiar classes of ulonders is creaLed by
certain multinational agreements, such as the Hague Convention, as well as by bilateral
agreements; § 3192(d)(1) codifies existing standards for bail in extradition cases, permitting
release only if the fugitive can demonstrate "special circumstances" warranting it (however,
§ 3192(d)(2) of H.R. 6046 takes a different approach, using the standards in the Bail Reform
Act with slight modifications); § 3194(d) (§3194(g)(1)) simplifies procedures for the authentication of documents and also establishes that extraditability can be determined solely on
hearsay or documentary evidence (§ 3194(g)(3) of H.R. 6046 only permits a court to "consider" such evidence); § 3196(a)(3) (§3196(a)) authorizes the Secretary of State to extradite
U.S. nationals unless such surrender is expressly prohibited by the applicable treaty, thus
reversing the effect of Valentine v. U.S. ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). Differences
between the original Senate version and the House version were discussed by Rep. Hughes
in the Congressional Record. 128 CONG. REc. E2241 (May 13, 1982).
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(1) Extradition shall not be granted if. . . (c)(i) the offense for which
extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party as one of a
political character; or (ii) the person sought proves that the request
for his extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish
him for an offense of a political character.'
For sound policy reasons, it has long been considered the exclusive
province of the Secretary of State to determine whether the extradition
request is politically motivated.6 On the other hand, for no particularly
apparent reason, American courts have exercised jurisdiction over the
"political offense" issue since the case of In re Ezeta in 1894. 7
Congress is attempting to revise U.S. extradition laws, spurred in
part by recent efforts of international terrorists to use the "political offense" exception as a loophole to avoid extradition. The decisions in several recent extradition cases involving terrorists illustrate the problem.
These cases reveal serious flaws in the existing judicial test for determining what constitutes a "political offense" and make clear that such a determination involves foreign policy choices that should be made by Congress and the President, not the courts.
The traditional Anglo-American test for defining a "political offense," as reflected in these decisions, represents a grave danger to world
order. It is not so much thatthe United States may well become a more

5. Treaty on Extradition, Oct. 21, 1976, United States-United Kingdom, art. V., 28
U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
6. The rationale for deferring to the executive branch is described in the leading case
on this point:
[Ilt is not a part of the court proceedings ... to exercise discretion as to
whether the criminal charge is a cloak for political action, not whether the
request is made in good faith. Such matters should be left to the Department
of State.
...It is thought by the court that application to the Secretary of State of
the United States will furnish full protection against the delivery of the accused to any government which will not live up to its treaty obligations, and
that the Secretary of State will be fully satisfied (before delivering the accused
to the demanding government) that he is wanted (in the legal sense of that
term) upon a criminal charge, that it is not sought to secure him from a country upon which he is depending as an asylum because of political matters, and
that the treaty is not actually used as a subterfuge.
In re Lincoln, 228 F. 70, 74 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), affd per curiam sub nor., Lincoln v. Power,
241 U.S. 651 (1916). Accord Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir.
1971); In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
7. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894). In Ezeta, the particular treaty specified that "the provisions of this treaty shall not apply to any crime or offense of a political character." Id. at
997. The district judge held that he could not leave it to the executive branch but rather
had to determine the question, because the treaty "terminates [the magistrate's] jurisdiction
when the political character of the crime or offense is established." Id. Until recently, the
Government did not challenge the courts' exercise of jurisdiction over the political offense
issue. When Government attorneys finally began to question jurisdiction, they were met
with the courts' response that the practice was not too traditional to be changed without
legislative approval. In re Mackin, 668 F. 2d 122, 13237 (2d Cir. 1981); Earn v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d 504, 51317 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
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attractive refuge for members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO), Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Bader-Meinhoff
gang, the Italian Red Brigade and other terrorists, though that is possible. Rather, the danger lies in the impact of these decisions overseas. Recent U.S. court decisions have sent out a message to the world that the
American judicial system accepts the notion that the end justifies the
means and that political violence is an acceptable method of accomplishing political goals. These decisions appear to place a stamp of approval
on, and thereby sanctify, terrorist activities of all kinds. A legislative remedy to counter this danger is essential.
In each of these recent U.S. cases, the test of a "relative" political
offense set forth in the nineteenth-century English case of In re Castioni8
was blindly accepted and mechanically applied. The court in Castioni
stated that a political offense is a crime which is "incidental to and
formed a part of political disturbances."9
In the McMullen case, Peter McMullen was charged with the bombing of a British army installation in England. In the Mackin case,
Desmond Mackin was charged with the attempted murder of a British
soldier dressed in civilian clothes who had been standing at a bus stop in
Belfast.1 In the Quinn case, William Quinn was charged with the murder
of a London police officer and participating in at least eight bombing incidents. 2 Dutifully applying the Castioni test, the magistrates in both

8. (1891] 1 Q.B. 149. In Castioni,Switzerland sought the extradition of a man charged
with murder. The death had occurred during a riot and appeared to have been more accidental than intentional. The court justified the decision not to extradite by stating that,
after a civil war, "one cannot look too hardly and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot
in their Dolitical excitement." Id. at 167.
9. Id. at 153.
10. In re the Extradition of McMullen, No. 37-81-099 MG (N.D. Cal., filed May 11,
1979) (Woelflen, Magis.), reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 294. See also
McMullen v. I.N.S., 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981) (deportation stayed on ground that the
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was likely to "persecute" him as a defector if he
was returned to Ireland).
11. In re Extradition of Desmond Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 13,
1981) (Buchald, Magis.), reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 140, appeal
dismissed sub noam. U.S. v. States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). The magistrate
concluded that the PIRA, or "provos," were conducting a violent political uprising in one
area of Beftt. The U.S. executive brarnch tok the position that PIRA activity consisted of
individual acts of violence aimed frequently at civilians and designed to destabilize society
rather than overthrow the government directly and accordingly fell outside the political offense exception, but the magistrate rejected this sensible analysis. 1981 Sen. Hearings,
supra note 2, at 214-22. The author has been informed by the prosecutor in this case that,
in return for the government's agreement to drop any further extradition proceedings,
Mackin consented to be deported to the Republic of Ireland in December, 1981.
12. Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-6688, slip op. (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 3, 1983) (Aguilar,
J.). The district court granted Quinn's petition for habeas corpus and set aside an earlier
decision by a magistrate ordering extradition. Crim. No. CR-81-146 Misc. (N.D. Cal., filed
Sept. 29, 1982) (Langford, Magis.). U.S. District Judge Robert Aguilar concluded that the
conspiracy to cause explosions charge against Quinn was "incidental to and in the course of"
a political uprising because the bombings were intended "to protest British rule in Northern
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Mackin and McMullen and the district court in Quinn concluded that
extradition was prohibited since a political "disturbance" or "uprising"
was taking place in Northern Ireland and the attempts by Mackin, McMullen, and Quinn, as members of the outlawed Provisional Irish Repub-

lican Army, to kill British security personnel, were "incidental to" these
disturbances.
In the Abu Eain case, Ziyad Abu Eain, an alleged member of the
Palestinian Liberation Organization, was charged with planting a bomb
which killed or injured several children in an Israeli resort town.'

On

habeas corpus review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the magistrate's original determination that the "political offense"
exception was inapplicable, because the bombing was not "incidental to"
the PLO's objectives and "solely implicates anarchist-like activity.""
While the result is entirely correct, the Seventh Circuit's application of
the Castionitest in Abu Eain was ultimately just as mechanical as that in
Mackin, McMullen and Quinn. Indeed, the court appeared to accept the
proposition that "acts that disrupt the political structure of a State, and
not the social structure" would be exempt."'
The absurdity and ultimate cruelty of the Castioni test is illustrated
by the statement of the magistrate in McMullen that "[e]ven though the
offense be deplorable and heinous, the criminal actor will be excluded
from deportation [sic] if the crime is committed under these
prerequisites.""6

Ireland and to bring the British to the bargaining table." Slip op. at 36. Judge Aguilar
added that "any violence coming to the general civilian population was incidental to the
political goal of seeking an end to Northern Ireland". Id. In rejecting the applicability of
Abu Eain, the district court criticized the Seventh Circuit as "emotion[al]," and stated that
"liberal application of the Eain decision could result in the extradition court making judgments as to the goals of a particular uprising group and the appropriateness of the acts of
the uprising group." Id. at 3739. The district court also attacked the magistrate's conclusion
that Quinn, who is an American, had to be a member of the uprising group in order to gain
the protection of the political offense exceptions. Judge Aguilar held this requirement to be
without precedent and "unwarranted." Id. at 17.
13. In re Extradition of Eain, Magis. No. 79 M 175 (N.D. Ill., filed Dec. 18, 1979)
(Jurco, Magis.), writ of habeas corpus denied sub nom. Eain v. Wilkes, note 7 supra. On
Dec. 12, 1981, UnderSecretary of State William P. Clark signed a surrender warrant which
was accompanied by a memorandum decision, which is reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings,
supra note 2, at 133. After his return to Israel, Eain was found guilty of murder by a threejudge court and, in June of 1982, sentenced to life imprisonment. Christian Sci. Monitor,
Aug. 18, 1982, at 13, col. 1.
14. 641 F.2d at 52021.
15. Id. Moreover, it is a measure of how far the "political offense" exception can be cut
loose from ethical moorings that Abu Eain's defense team could argue in apparent good
faith that terror bombing of civilians is a legitimate technique in an "insurrection-liberation" struggle and that the political offense exception prevents extradition for such a crime.
The defense argued that for the PLO to achieve its political purpose in Israel, it is necessary
for it to engage in acts of violence such as bombings in public places, since "an occupied
people regards every occupier as part of the usurping state's political being." Petitioner's
Brief in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 9, Eain, 641 F.2d 504.
16. McMullen, No. 37-81-099 MG, reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at
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The Castioni test used by the courts in the cases discussed above is
seriously flawed. The courts in the relatively few English and American
cases dealing with the "political offense" exception 7 have repeated this
test without once questioning its fundamental validity.
The unsettling results in McMullen, Mackin and Quinn and the implications of Abu Eain suggest that much of what has previously been
written about the "political offense" exception by the courts is misleading
or just plain wrong. The error may be accounted for because the "right"
result in early cases seemed so obvious or was reached so intuitively that
the courts were lulled into accepting the first "test" that fit the facts
without giving much thought to its ramifications. Indeed, some of the
cases suggest that the courts, despite their purported reliance on such a
test, were actually engaged in making political judgments, not legal
ones.-I
No court has ever questioned whether an all-encompassing, objective
"test" is appropriate, and yet the "test" formulated by Anglo-American
courts in the 1890s is in fact based on assumptions which, when extended
to their logical conclusion, seem fundamentally at odds with the likely
intent of the treaty draftsmen and our present beliefs. As modern courts
carefully and conscientiously have applied the letter of this earlier case
law, absurd and dangerous results have become more frequent, and the
divergencies from the probable intent of the treaty writers has become
more and more apparent. Neither before, during nor after the decisions
that run from In re Ezeta to In re Quinn have the considerations in making a "political offense" determination been as simplistic as these cases
have indicated. Certainly, there has never been any intellectually-accepted definition for a "political offense." Other countries do not accept
the mechanical Castioni test, either. 19
294.
17. For a discussion of the older cases as well as of McMullen and Abu Eain, see Hannay, International Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 18
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381 (1980).
18. See United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959)
and Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959). These cases can only be explained as
efforts by the courts to avoid cooperating in any way with Communist regimes of which they
did not approve; indeed, the court in Abu Eain characterized Artukovic, in which a Croatian
war criminal was Judged immune from extradition to Yugoslavia on political offense
grounds, as "one of the most roundly criticized cases in the history of American jurisprudence." 641 F.2d at 522.
19. See, e.g., Ruling on the Requests for the Extradition of Tomas Linaza-Echevarria,
No. 57781 (Court of Appeals of Paris, filed June 3, 1981), reprinted in Dept. of State, Div.
of Language Services, Translation No. 81/16601. There, the Chambre d'Accusation of the
French Court of Appeals upheld the extradition of Linaza-Echevarra, a reputed Basque terrorist, for the murders of an alderman and six members of the Civil Guard in Spain. The
fugitive claimed that the acts with which he was charged "were perpetrated as part of the
struggle for political autonomy waged by a segment of the population in the Basque provinces of Spain." Id. at 8. The Court rejected this claim, stating:
Irrespective of the objective sought or possible context, most of these offenses
are too serious to be regarded as having a political character or as being related
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As extradition treaties became prevalent in the nineteenth century,
democratic nations undoubtedly found themselves facing the unpleasant
task of sending political dissenters or activists back to tyrannical regimes
to stand trial for acts which democracies did not perceive as "criminal" in
any ethical or moral sense. Through the mechanism of the "political offense" exception, a conflict between the affirmative obligation to extradite
under a treaty and the desire to grant political asylum was avoided. The
fugitive newspaper editor or political candidate charged with sedition or
treason merely for expressing his opinions could be sheltered from extradition for such a "pure" political offense, the sort of offense directly implicating cherished democratic values. Similarly, the fugitive dissident
charged with criminal trespass or property damage during a protest rally
could be sheltered from unjust persecution for his "relative" political offense, the sort of offense that smacks of a "trumped up" charge.20
In addition to, and wholly apart from, its function of sheltering those
whose only crime is speaking out, the "political offense" exception functions as a useful mechanism by which states may avoid becoming entangled in the internal political upheaval of other nations.2 1 Through the exception, states may avoid being forced to favor one side over another
during uncertain civil wars or being compelled to assist the winners wreak
vengeance on the losers after a political coup.
It is important to keep in mind that we are not dealing with the substantive rights of a fugitive. The "political- offense" exception, just as the
concept of political asylum, is not a recognition of some inalienable right
of the fugitive to commit crimes in another country and escape extradition merely because the offenses were committed with a political purpose.
The right involved is that of the state which has an interest in being able,
when the state deems it appropriate, to give political asylum for humanitarian reasons or simply to refuse to become involved in the domestic

to a political offense.
The less serious acts cannot be disassociated from others, for they either
contributed to their perpetration or were the immediate consequence thereof.
By reason of the means employed, these acts are all too serious in nature
to be covered by the nonextradition exception ....
Id. at 89.
20. See text at notes 49-52 infra. Purely political offenses "encompass acts directed
against the state which contain none of the elements of ordinary crime." Garcia-Mora, The
Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226,
1230 (1963). The "pure" offenses have generally been thought to be treason, sedition, espionage, and the like. Cantrell, The PoliticalOffense Exception in InternationalExtradition:
A Comparisonof the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ.
L. REv. 777, 780 (1977). A "relative" political offense is one "in which a common crime is so
connected with a political act that the entire offense is regarded as political." Garcia-Mora,
supra, at 1230-31.
21. See E. STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A RESTATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 272 (1931),
cited in H.R. REP. No. 627, PT. 1, supra note 3, at 23, who states: "The underlying rationale
for the political offense exception is that the requested State should not be forced into a
position of actively participating on one side or another of a country's political dispute."
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political disputes of other states.
The "political offense" exception thus serves as a useful shorthand or
euphemism for these concerns of the state. There is widespread agreement for the abstract proposition that a state should refuse to send a
dissident back to unjust persecution or refuse to allow the mechanism of
extradition to be used for mere vengeance. The difficulty comes in properly categorizing particular fact situations in such terms. The attempt to
define what constitutes a "political offense" by using a single "test" has
created problems and led to an unfortunate confusion between the two
different purposes of the exception.
The Castioni test seems to imply acceptance of a "right to rebel." It
is doubtful, however, that a study of nineteenth-century diplomatic
sources would corroborate the notion that the "political offense" exception was intended as a recognition of such an absolute and unqualified
"right." Despite broadly-phrased statements by philosophers such as
John Stuart Mill 2 and by some of our founding fathers," democratic nations have never accepted the principle that any politically disaffected
group anywhere can take up arms for the purpose of replacing the existing government and thereby be automatically protected from extradition for common crimes of violence. A situation in which "good" rebels
are trying to overthrow "bad" rulers, such as the American Revolution,
may be acceptable and even laudatory. But what about "bad" rebels and
"good" governments? Do fair ends justify unfair means? And who is to
judge? None of these questions can be thought to have been answered
with unanimity in either the nineteenth or the twentieth century. The
court in Castioni confused the two different purposes of the political offense exception and produced a "test" that, in the eyes of the later courts,
appears to confer absolute and unqualified immunity from extradition on
violent revolutionaries. Yet the judges who sat on the Castioni case would
surely be shocked by the statement of the magistrate in McMullen, that
their test precludes extradition "[elven though the offense be deplorable
and heinous."24
Such a conclusion could never have been intended by the diplomats

"Political liberties or rights which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the
ru1-.22.
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-
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-
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to be held justifiable." J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 2 (1847). As the counsel for the defense in
Castioni noted, Mill once suggested the following definition of a political offense: "Any offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or political commotion." In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. at 153.
23. E.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1787) ("I hold it
that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as necessary in the political world
as storms in the physical.") and First Inaugural Address by Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 4, 1861)
("Whenever [the people] shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise
their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it.")
24. McMullen, No. 37-81-099 MG, at 3, reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note
10, at 294.
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who negotiated our extradition treaties or the Senators who consented to
them. No possible value could be thought to accrue either to this country
or to the international legal order from a rule that prevents the extradi25
tion of any and all who use political violence to achieve political ends.
The test applied by the magistrates in McMullen and Mackin and
the district court in Quinn was the same as that applied by the Seventh
Circuit in Abu Eain and by other courts reaching back to Ezeta. Yet the
ramifications of this test have not been clearly seen until now. There is no
good reason to continue the unquestioned repetition of the Castionitest,
for it more often leads courts away from a just result rather than towards
one. A better test must be fashioned.
II.

EXECUTIVE DETERMINATION OF THE "POLITICAL OFFENSE" ISSUE: THE
ROAD NOT TAKEN

The original version of S. 1940 prohibited the courts from exercising

jurisdiction over the "political offense" issue" and provided that the Secretary of State alone shall determine the matter.2 7 Although this approach was recommended by the administrations of both President
Carter and President Reagan,"' it was met by a barrage of criticism, par25. A recent student note suggests that "genuinely politically motivated terrorism can
induce genuinely politically motivated prejudice at trial, so that asylum for the terrorist is
not so clearly outside the purposes of the exception." Note, American Courts and Modern
Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 623 (1981). See
also Cantrell, supra note 20, at 782. That possibility is no justification for imposing a blanket rule that prevents extradition of those perpetrating violence for political reasons in
countries where the Rule of Law is strong enough to prevent public or governmental outrage
from interfering with fair procedures. The Executive Branch of this country, for example,
has shown itself perfectly capable of refusing extradition when a fair trial cannot be expected in the requesting state. See, e.g., M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 424 n.121 (1974), noting the refusal of the Department of State to
extradite the fugitive General Huertas to Mexico because of both the political nature of the
crimes with which he had been charged and "the lack of an orderly machinery of justice by
which a fair trial could be accomplished."
26. Section 3194(a) of S. 1940, as introduced by Sen. Thurmond, states in part as
follows:
The court does not have jurisdiction to determine the merits of the charge
against the person by the foreign state or to determine whether the foreign
state is seeking the extradition of the person for a political offense, for an offense of a political character, or for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing
the person for his political opinions.
1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 340.
27. Section 3196(a) of S. 1940 as introduced by Sen. Thurmond provides: "The Secretary of State . . . (3) shall decline to order the surrender of the person if the Secretary is
persuaded, by written evidence and argument submitted to him by the person sought, that
the foreign state is seeking the person's extradition for a political offense." Id. at 346. Section 3196(a) of the bill also provides: "[a] decision of the Secretary of State under paragraph
(3) . . .is final and not subject to judicial review." Id.

28. An identical version of S. 1639 had been introduced by Sen. Kennedy as a floor
amendment to Chapter 32 of S. 1722, the 1980 version of the Criminal Code Reform Act, in
the waning days of the 96th Congress. Correspondence supporting the changes from officials
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ticularly from civil liberties groups who were generally suspicious of the
executive branch and perceived the legislation as a direct assault on due
process and other Constitutional protections for extradition targets."
Hearings were held by both Houses, 0 and battle lines were drawn on
the issue of whether the executive "model" was superior to the judicial
model.8 ' In reporting out a new version of S. 1940, the Senate Judiciary
Committee rejected the criticism and recognized the strong and obvious
policy considerations justifying the elimination of the courts'
jurisdiction. 2
The McMullen, Mackin, Abu Eain, and Quinn cases have revealed
something more than the flaws in the Castioni test. They have shown
that the determination of the "political offense" issue is a major foreign
policy determination which is ill-suited to the judiciary. The flaw permeating those cases cannot fully be corrected by drafting a statute to give
courts more guidance. The "political offense" exception defies the creation of judicially manageable standards. The analysis called for, whatever
the test, inevitably thrusts the courts into foreign waters, both literally
of the Carter administration accompanied the bill. See 126 CONG. REC. S. 13,233 (daily ed.
Sept. 23, 1980).
29. See, e.g., Letter from American Civil Liberties Union to Sen. Thurmond, dated December 8, 1982, reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings,supra note 2, at 80. The ACLU expressed
the following fear:
With regard to extradition, the exigencies of diplomatic relations render the
exclusive determination of the political offense exception particularly unsuited
to the executive branch; conflicting interests would undoubtedly result in an
inconsistent and unfair application of standards. The integrity of such a process would be difficult, if not impossible, to preserve.
1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 90.
Far from being confined to mere paper-shuffling, as some critics think, our courts would
have continued to play a central role in the extradition process. Under S.1940, as in current
practice, a judicial hearing before a neutral magistrate must be held to determine whether
there was evidence establishing probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed and that the person sought had committed it. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3184 with § 3194 of
S.1940. Thus, the most basic protection from spurious or "trumped up" charges would have
remained intact.
30. The Senate hearings were published (See 1981 Sen. Hearings, note 2 supra), but
the House hearings were not.
31. Professor Steven Lubet of Northwestern University, who testified at House hearings
on extraditon1-1
usfuynlyl
c the deba.s in tern
f "xutivjdcil
- ..
n
synthesis models" of deciding the political offense question. See Lubet, Extradition Reform:
Executive Discretionand Judicial Participationin the Extraditionof PoliticalTerrorists,
15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247 (1982).
32. The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded that the Executive Branch should
make such a determination because 1) most modern United States extradition treaties specify that the Executive Branch of the requested country shall decide the applicability of the
political offense exception (e.g., Extradition Treaty, United States-Mexico, May 4, 1978, entered into force Jan. 25, 1980, art. 5(1), 31 U.S.T. 5059), 2) such decisions do not lend themselves to resolution through the judicial process, and 3) the U.S. government needs to take a
public position on the applicability of the political offense exception before all the evidence
and arguments are in to avoid a "devastating impact" and a "potentially crippling effect on
the nation's foreign relations." S. REP. No. 331 at 1415.
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and figuratively. In order to apply the "political offense" exception,
courts have been increasingly drawn into the most searching analyses of
the social, political and economic histories of the foreign countries requesting extradition. Such analyses lead to lengthy and time consuming
proceedings which delay extradition for months and even years. Moreover, the process creates a dangerous interference with the conduct of our
foreign policy, as judges, distant from the diplomatic and political arena,
make findings on political situations in foreign countries which are subject to misinterpretation and misuse abroad.
In the Mackin case, for example, the magistrate went far beyond the
facts surrounding the alleged shooting incident and received lengthy testimony and elaborate documentary evidence bearing on the entire history
of Anglo-Irish relations. 8 After reviewing this evidence the magistrate
concluded that "there was a political conflict in Andersontown, Belfast,
Northern Ireland in March of 1978 which was part of an ongoing political
uprising."3 ' The magistrate in Quinn went through a similar historical
odyssey and was even more sweeping in his conclusions. In analyzing
whether the political offense exception applied to Quinn's alleged crimes
in London, the magistrate concluded that the element of a "violent political uprising" was satisfied, even by isolated incidents of violence in
London, reasoning as follows:
[I]n a constitutional sense Northern Ireland is a part of the United
Kingdon, and offenses committed in Northern Ireland are offenses
against the same sovereign, though the Court notes that different sets
of laws apply. In Northern Ireland, before, during, and after the period in question, there was what can only be described as a severe
[T]he violence was of
armed insurrection with a political basis ....
such intensity that it brought down one government and forced its
replacement to impose severe curbs on personal liberty. 8
The potential detriment to our relations with the United Kingdom as
well as the danger of interference in the domestic political affairs of another country from this sort of pronouncement is very real.86 Indeed, it

33. After hearings on the "political offense" issue lasting seven days and consuming
more than a thousand pages of transcript, the magistrate issued a 100-page opinion that
discussed the political and historical heritage of Northern Ireland, a treatment of the religious underpinnings of the past and present disturbances there, references to supposed
abuses by various governmental authorities, a lengthy discussion of the general level of violence in Northern Ireland, a description of British legal procedures for the prosecution of
suspected terrorists, and an assessment of the support for IRA activities within the Catholic
community at large. See Magistrate's Opinion, No. 80 Cr. Misc. at 40, reprinted in 1981
Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 188-218.
34. Id. at 83, reprinted in 1981 Sen. Hearings, supra note 2, at 222.
35. Magistrate's Opinion, Crim. No. CR81146 Misc. (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 3, 1983).
36. "Finally, a decision on the political offense exception can have a devastating impact
on United States relations with the requesting country. The potentially crippling effect of
such decisions on foreign affairs is particularly great where it could compromise United
States efforts to combat international terrorism." S. REP. No. 331, supra note 2, at 15.
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appears that the magistrate's opinion in Mackin was widely circulated in
Northern Ireland on behalf of the hunger strikers in British custody who
sought to be recognized and treated as "political" offenders, thus inflam3 7
ing an already tense situation.
The flaw in the present approach is precisely illustrated by testimony
during hearings in the House on H.R. 5227. Arguing that the new legislation should not flatly exclude murder or other violent crimes from the
"political offense" exception, one scholar pointed out to a Congressional
committee: "We may not now wish to extend [political offense] protection
to factions such as the Red Brigades of Italy, but we should not fashion a
definition which also serves to exclude rebels such as the anti-Soviet partisans currently fighting in Afghanistan.13 The witness went on to suggest that a definition should be devised which "[tihe courts would maintain .. .the ability to extend the protection of the exception to those
whom we might wish to call legitimate rebels or actual contenders in a
national struggle for power."3 " The United States should certainly be able
to distinguish between "legitimate" rebels and "bad" ones and to grant
asylum when appropriate, but judges should not be the ones to make that
sort of political choice.
Any approach to the "political offense" exception which leaves to
courts the determination of whether we extradite Red Brigadiers or Afghan guerrillas perpetuates a serious misalignment of responsibility. For
example, the United States magistrates in the Mackin and McMullen
cases and the district court in Quinn held that an unprovoked attack on
British security personnel or installations by IRA gunmen constitutes a
"political offense" and hence an act worthy of immunity from extradition.
If such a dangerous policy is to be adopted, judges should not be the ones
to do it. As the New York Times said in an editorial favoring the elimination of court jurisdiction, "Leaving diplomacy to diplomats provides better and speedier justice." 0
The question of whether an improper political motivation underlies
an extradition request has always been decided by the Executive
Branch."1 No critic of the Senate approach has offered a single instance in
which a Secretary of State has unjustly exercised his discretion over the

.7. See Brief for Appellant at 32, United States v. Mackin, 669 .R2d 122 (2d Cir. 19R1).
38. Lubet, Statement before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime,
reprinted in S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 10.
39. Id. at 11.
40. New York Times, Dec. 29, 1981, at A14, col. 1. As Professor Lubet points out,
"[t]here is no uniform international practice regarding the procedure for applying the political offense exception." Lubet, supra note 31, at 290 n.251. E.g., Canada, Australia, and West
Germany follow a strictly executive approach. Id.; accord S. REP. No. 331, supra note 2, at
1415. But see H.R. REP. No. 627, supra note 3, Pt. 1 at 22 n.52, citing an unpublished
Library of Congress report which asserts that the courts in all countries surveyed except
Canada and Australia play at least some part in determining whether a person is extraditable or not because of the political or nonpolitical nature of his offense.
41. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
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political motivation question."" There is no good reason not to entrust to
executive discretion the equally "political" question of the nature of the
offense.
Despite these strong arguments, the House Judiciary Committee
opted to retain court jurisdiction over the political offense determination
in reporting out its extradition reform bill. 8 The House committee identified four reasons for this decision:
(1) It accords with the "statutory and administrative practices of the
past one hundred and forty years in the United States"; (2) The Department of State can always "share" with the courts its unique expertise and specialized knowledge about conditions in the requesting
country; (3) Extradition matters generally, and the political offense
determination specifically, should take place before an independent
judiciary because to do otherwise would be "highly dangerous to liberty"; and (4) Having the initial determination made by the judiciary
allows our diplomats to "avoid .

.

. embarrassment" and, in effect,

blame the courts when an ally's extradition request is denied.44

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which acted essentially contemporaneously with the House Committee, also adopted the judicial
"model," recommending fundamental changes in the original version of S.
1940. 41 The Senate adopted these amendments without any floor
debate."'
While this writer testified in support of the original version of S. 1940
42. If anything, political pressure is more often brought to bear on the Secretary of
State not to grant extradition than to grant it. For example, a number of Arab ambassadors
unsuccessfully pressured Secretary Haig to harbor PLO terrorist Ziyad Abu Eain after the
courts in Chicago ordered him extradited to Israel. Washington Post, Dec. 13, 1981, at A8,
col. 1. Under such pressure, other countries may be less willing than the United States to
honor their international committment to extradite terrorists, even where courts have ruled
that their crimes are not "political offenses." For example, despite the French Court of Appeals decision in the Linaza-Echevarriacase, the Socialist government of President Francois Mitterand announced its refusal to extradite any Basque terrorists. Note 19 supra. See
also The Economist, June 20, 1981, at 53. There is no more basis for the fear that our
diplomats will capitulate to requests from authoritarian regimes for extradition of their political opponents than there is for a fear that judges will be bribed by the accused fugitive.
Loose speculation about public officials' motivation is no good ground for opposition to a
useful and needed piece of legislation.
43. See H.R. 6046, reprinted in H. R. RE. No. 627, Pt. 1, supra note 3, at 48.
44. H.R. REP. No 627, Pt. 1, supra note 3, at 21-22.
45. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed similar reasoning:
Most countries with whom the U.S. has extradition agreements permit the
courts to make such determinations. Moreover, American courts have reviewed
political offense questions for nearly one hundred years. Preserving limited
court jurisdiction to interpret the exception pursuant to legislative guidelines
would continue this well-established tradition. It would also provide a check
against an executive authority that could, depending upon the political sensitivities involved in a given case, result in inconsistent and unsound application
of the political offense exception.
S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 7.
46. 128 CONG. REC. S10,884 (1982).
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at hearings in October of 1981"' and continues to believe that the executive model is the best approach to the "political offense" determination, it
is unlikely that Congress will reconsider this fundamental issue. The central issue, therefore, is what legislative guidance should be given to the
courts in exercising jurisdiction.
III.

REPLACING THE

Castioni TEST WITH NEW GUIDELINES

Both S. 1940 (the extradition reform bill passed by the Senate) and
H.R. 6046 (the House Judiciary Committee version) set forth "negative"
guidelines for the courts to use in determining what is not a "political
offense." The Senate version identified certain crimes that could never be
political offenses and certain other crimes that could only be political offenses "in extraordinary circumstances." Section 3194(e) of S. 1940 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(1) For purposes of this section a political offense does not include:
(A) an offense within the scope of the [Hague] Convention . ..
(B) an offense within the scope of the [Montreal] Convention
(C) a serious offense involving an attack against the life, physical
...
, including diplomatic agents;
(D) an offense with respect to which a ... multilateral treaty obintegrity, or liberty of internationally protected persons

ligates the United States either extradite or ...

prosecute a per-

son accused of the offense;
(E) [a narcotics] offense ...
(F) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described [in
A through E .

.

. above];

(2) For the purposes of this section a political offense, except in extraordinary circumstances, does not include:
(A) an offense that consists of homicide, assault with intent to
commit. . . serious bodily injury, rape, kidnapping, the taking of
a hostage, or a ...

serious unlawful detention;

(B) an offense involving the use of a firearm ... if such use endangers a . . . person other than the offender... ;

(C) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described [in
A or B . . . above].

If an extradition bill had been passed in the 97th Congress, it would most
likely have included a "political offense" provision in the form set forth
above.4" The question then becomes whether these guidelines would do

47. See Testimony of William M. Hannay, 1981 Sen. Hearings,supra note 2, at 25-64.
48. H.R. 6046 had the same list of crimes quoted in the text, but applied the "extraordinary circumstances" concept to all of them. The sponsor of the House bill subsequently agreed that the Senate's language was preferable. See Letter from William J.
Hughes, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Crime, to Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, House
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the job.
At this stage, both Houses have rejected the approach of enunciating
a new, positive definition of what constitutes a "political offense." This
makes sense. First, the "pure" political offenses, such as advocating the
overthrow of a government and other conduct punishable as seditious or
treasonous, so implicate free speech and other democratic ideals that no
extradition treaty to which the United States is a party even includes
them as extraditable offenses. Moreover, any attempt to list or define
such "pure" offenses runs the risk of quickly becoming overbroad, as the
House Judiciary Committee has concluded."9 Similar problems of overbreadth afflict any attempt to define "relative" political offense. Indeed,
it is the overbreadth inherent in the Castionitest that produced the furor
that, in large measure, produced the impetus for new legislation.
Even in eschewing a positive definition of political offense, Congress
is making one thing clear: the traditional Castioni test is no longer to be
viewed as the only (or even the best) guide to what a political offense is.
Regardless of their views on which particular crimes should be excluded
from the political offense exception, the Congressmen involved in the
drafting process are unanimous in their desire for courts to apply the concepts of "predominance" and "proportionality" in deciding whether a
crime is a political offense. These concepts were developed in the legislative history, as follows.
While the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations "recognizes that
current case law continues to apply" to crimes not specified on the list of
nonpolitical offenses, the Committee took pains to draw attention to the
"commonly-used standard" that bars extradition "when the state from
which extradition is sought determines that the political content of the
act outweighs the harm that may have been done in committing the offense." 5 Similarly, the House Judiciary Committee stated its expectation
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, (July 23, 1982), reprinted in in H.R. Rep. No 627, supra note 3,
Pt. 2 at 45. Rep. Hughes adopted the Senate language in H.R. 2643, which was introduced
in the House of Representatives on April 20, 1982.
49. A predecessor version of H.R. 6046 listed certain acts which would "normally" constitute political offenses. See H.R. 5227, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3194(e)(2) (1981). The list
included "sedition," "treason," and "unlawful political advocacy, but only if the advocacy is
not to engage imminently in violence under circumstances in which it is likely that such
advocacy will imminently incite such violence." These positive definitions were eliminated
by the House Judiciary Committee as overbroad, stating that "although treason and espionage have traditionally been considered as political offenses, some conduct that is encompassed within these types of crimes will also constitute a violation of generally recognized
international law, and therefore not be appropriate to always treat as a political offense." H.
R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1 supra note 3, at 24.
50. S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 3 & 8. The Committee also quoted with approval
the testimony of Professor Lubet, who explained that "[a] broad definition need not be a
mechanistic or all-inclusive one. The word 'political' may have different meanings in different contexts, and the United States is under no legal or moral obligation to shelter a fugitive
from extradition simply because he claims a political motive for his crime." Lubet, Statement before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Crime, supra note 38, re-
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that, except for the enumerated offenses, "courts will continue to apply
the traditional political offense test as enunciated in In re Castioni," but
the Committee prefaced this statement by pointing out that:
[T]he traditional definition of political offenses encompasses too many
crimes. In the nearly one hundred years since the first political offense
cases were decided, the international legal community has come to
recognize that certain offenses, even if they involve an offense of a
political character, are too heinous to escape prosecution and punishment. Recognized examples of these offenses include killing a head of
state. "
In addition, the House Judiciary Committee expressly stated its expectation that courts will "examine existing French and Swiss motivation
precedents in this area" in determining whether crimes not listed in the
new legislation are to be deemed "political."52
Turning to the approach of enumerating crimes that are not political
offenses, the first question is whether there are crimes that should never
be considered political offenses. For several reasons, the answer to that is
certainly "yes." As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has recognized, "it is inappropriate to apply the political offense exception to conduct that the international community has taken formal steps to prohibit
and punish." s Thus the political offense exception should not even be
considered by the court if applying it would have the effect of protecting
behavior that is specifically outlawed by international treaties, such as
the Tokyo,54 Hague,"5 and Montreal 56 conventions with respect to aircraft

printed in S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 3.
51. H. R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1, supra note 3, at 23-24.

52. Id. at 26. The Committee specifically referred courts to the discussion of those
precedents discussed in a seminal article by Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses:
A Knotty Problem of ExtraditionLaw, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1249-57 (1962). There, Professor Garcia-Mora quoted the rule in In re Giovanni Gatti, [1947] Ann. Dig. 145 (No. 70)

(Fr.): "The offense does not derive its political character from the motive of the offender but
from the nature of the rights it injures." Id. at 145-46. He also described "the celebrated
Swiss theory of predominance, which essentially means that ... the political element must
predominate over the common crime," i.e., must not be out of proportion to the end sought.
Garcia-Mora, supra, at 1249-50. In discussing the Swiss proportionality test the author relied on the Wassilieff case, where the murder of a police chief was held not to be a political
offense "since other means of redress were available." Id. at 1254. For further discussion of
the Swiss proportionality test, see generally Abu Eain, 641 F.2d at 521 n.21 ("proportionality and predominance may be unarticulated concepts in the existing Anglo-American framework of extradition") and Note, Bringing the Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Approach, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 82-83 (1978).
53. S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 7.
54. Convention on Offenses Aboard Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S.

No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 220.
55. Convention for the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641,

T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
56. Convention on Civil Aviation Safety, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No.
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hijacking, the Internationally Protected Persons (IPP) Convention, 5 the
Hostage Convention," and any future multilateral treaties obligating the
United States either to extradite or prosecute. The absolute prohibition
approach is also appropriate for crimes such as rape and narcotics violations, which could never have any meaningful nexus to a political
59
controversy.
An absolute prohibition, of course, has the procedural advantage of
sure and quick application, for courts can decide the political offense issue "on the pleadings," as it were. It would be a great boon to prosecutors
and defendants alike if time-consuming exercises in history, sociology,
and philosophy, such as those conducted in Mackin, McMullen, Abu
Eain, and Quinn, could be avoided and the time devoted to reviewing
these complex issues on appeal reduced.10 Unfortunately, Congress has
been unable to devise either an all-encompassing positive definition or a
complete list of negatives that will relieve courts of that burden. Some
flexibility in the area of "relative" political offenses seems necessary, and
the approach excluding crimes of violence or the use of firearms except
"in extraordinary circumstances" is acceptable when read in light of the
legislative history.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which amended the original version of S. 1940 to include the "extraordinary circumstances" concept, makes clear that the burden of demonstrating such circumstances is
on the person resisting extradition and that this burden is "a considerable
one."' The Committee explained the criteria for applying the concept as
follows:
It should not be the policy of the United States to encourage or condone violent or other criminal behavior simply because it is the view
of the persons committing such acts that they are somehow connected
with a political activity or have an obstensible [sic] political purpose
or justification. However, it should also not be the policy of the
United States to render up automatically to foreign authorities an individual who, in the course of seeking to exercise legitimate civil or

57. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973, entered into force
Feb. 20, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532. This convention has been implemented in
the U.S. by the enactment of 18 U.S.C. §§ 878, 1116-1117, & 1201.
58. International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/146
(1979), ratified by the United States July 30, 1981. See 127 CONG. REc. S8808-09 (daily ed.
July 30, 1981).
59. In S. 1940, rape was unintentionally listed among the crimes that could be deemed
a political offense "in extraordinary circumstances." That error has been corrected in the
version of the legislation now pending in the 98th Congress. See S. 220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 3194(e)(1)(F), introduced by Sen. Strom Thurmond on Jan. 27, 1983.
60. See, e.g., note 34 supra. Each of the trials in these cases lasted more than a week
and produced some two thousand pages of transcripts and documents. The possibility of
delay is great. For example, Ziyad Abu Eain was arrested on August 21, 1979 and finally
extradited to Israel on December 12, 1981. Wash. Post., Dec. 13, 1981, at A8, col. 3.
61. S. REP. No. 475, supra note 2, at 8.
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political rights in a nonviolent manner, is placed in such a position
that he has no reasonable choice except to commit an otherwise criminal act. For the court to make such a determination the test should be
focused upon the individual and whether the offense for which he is
sought was a consequence of the violation of his internationally recognized civil or political rights by the state requesting extradition. Acts
of indiscriminate or excessive violence or acts of deliberate brutality
would presumably never fall within the exception. 2
The Senate Committee's focus on the lack of any "reasonable choice,"
i.e., any alternative means of redress, is the correct focus for what constitutes an "extraordinary" circumstance. It has also been urged by an influential voice on the House side."
In reporting out H.R. 6046, the House Judiciary Committee suggested that courts should "evaluate a large number of factors" when applying the "extraordinary circumstances" language.64 These factors include whether the victim is "civilian, governmental or military," what
relationship exists between the person whose extradition is being sought
and any political organization, whether the crime allegedly committed
was done in furtherance of such organization's political goals, and what
the relative seriousness of the offense is.65 The House Committee's suggestion, however, leaves the matter too open-ended and fails to provide
courts with sufficient guidance at the very point they most need it.
The critical question is what kind of conduct is being protected by
the use of the "extraordinary circumstances" language. The Senate Committee protects one kind of conduct-unavoidable violence occasioned by
a violation of civil or political rights-and gives adequate guidance to
courts as to when to invoke the political offense exception. The House
Committee is obviously trying to protect, or at least to keep, the U.S.
from becoming embroiled in another kind of conduct: civil war. 6 More
precision in defining the intended result can be achieved without the risk
of courts sweeping too much into the political offense exception or excluding too much from its protection. This can be accomplished by two
steps: first, by creating an additional absolute prohibition and, second, by
clarifying the circumstances in which the Castioni test should apply.
As explained above, both Houses appear to agree that violence out of
proportion to the political end sought cannot be defined as a "political

62. Id.
63. Rep. Paul Findley has suggested that "extraordinary circumstances" include "acts
committed as a last resort by a person who has been subjected, in the state where such acts
occurred, to serious violations of internationally protected human rights and for whom such
acts are the only reasonable means of protection or flight from such conditions." H.R. REP.
No. 627, Pt. 2, supra note 3, at 7. (Statement of Hon. Paul Findley).
64. H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1, supra note 3, at 24.
65. Id. at 2425.
66. The House Committee defined the "underlying rationale" of the political offense
exception as keeping out of "another country's political dispute." H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 1,
supra note 3, at 23. See also note 22 supra.
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offense." Therefore, a new provision should be added to the absolute
prohibitions in Section 3194(e)(1) of S. 1940, such as the following: "An
offense that consists of intentional, direct participation in a wanton or
indiscriminate act of violence with extreme indifference to the risk of
causing death or serious bodily injury to persons not taking part in armed
hostilities." This provision would draw a sharp line between hostile acts
against a state and mere terrorism. 6 7 Such a salutory rule would plainly
have covered the situation in Abu Eain and eliminated the drawnout efforts of apologists for the PLO to characterize "a random bombing intended to result in the cold-blooded murder of civilians" as a political
offense."s It would also cover cases in which the victims include civilians
even though the targets are governmental facilities or officials. This new
exclusion alone, however, is not enough.
The second step to improving the legislative guidelines contained in
S. 1940 involves clarifying the circumstances in which the Castioni test
should be applied. This in turn involves a clarification of two factors: the
type of behavior that is not to be protected even in an armed conflict, and
the type of armed conflict that should trigger the Castioni test at all.
Recent work in this area by the American Bar Association is enormously
helpful and points the way to the correct resolution of the problem.
At its 1983 Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association adopted a resolution "strongly recommend[ing]" that extradition legislation be passed which will:
exclude all acts of terrorist violence from the application of the political offense exception

. .

. [and] preclude the application of the politi-

cal offense exception to offenses which constitute serious breaches of
the norms established under international humanitarian law applicable in international and noninternational armed conflicts, without
subjecting to extradition combatants for warlike acts which do not
transgress those norms. ' "9

67. Such a provision embodies the rationale of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Abu
Eain, 641 F.2d at 521 ("an offense having its impact on the citizenry, but not directly upon
the government, does not fall within the political offense exception") and responds to the
well-founded belief of many Congressmen that attacks on civilians can never be justified;
see, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 627, Pt. 2, supra note 3, at 8 (Statement of Hon. A. Erdahl) ("political offense does not include acts of violence involving wanton, indiscriminate, or reckless
bodily injury to persons in order to generate terror within a civilian population").
68. Abu Eain, 641 F.2d at 521. The proposed amendment would also slam shut the
loophole that the Seventh Circuit arguably left open in Abu Eain when it held that the
bombing was not "incidental to" the political conflict in Israel because there was no "direct
tie between the PLO and the specific violence alleged." Id. at 520. Though the court quoted
with approval a United Nations Secretariat study which stated that "the legitimacy of a
cause does not in itself legitimize the use of certain forms of violence especially against the
innocent," id. at 521, it left unclear what result would follow if the evidence had established
such a "direct tie." The correct answer is, of course, that the crime would still not be a
political offense because it fails the "proportionality" test. See note 53 supra. See also In re
Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415, discussed in Hannay, supra note 17, at 388-90.
69. American Bar Association, Report No. 104A (1983) (adopted as a resolution by the

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 13:1

To accomplish these goals, the ABA's Section of International Law and
Practice proposed certain amendments to Section 3194(e) of S. 1940.0
The ABA's proposed amendments would first of all delete "the taking of
a hostage" from the offenses subject to the "extraordinary circumstances"
test and add it to the list of absolute prohibitions in Section 3194(e)(1).
This change makes sense because such conduct is now expressly forbidden by the 1979 Hostage Convention7 1 and because, as the ABA points
out, "[i]t is difficult to conceive of any circumstance which would justify
72
this offense.
Second, the ABA's proposed amendments would specifically incorporate into the political offense definition the international laws of war
which have "developed limitations on the methods, means, and measures
of coercion and violence which may be used by the parties in any armed
conflict. '7' The ABA's proposed amendment would retain the prefatory
language in Section 3194(e)(2) of S. 1940, "[flor the purposes of this section a political offense, except in extraordinary circumstances, does not
include . . . ," but would substitute the following in place of Section
3194(e)(2)(A) and (B):
(A) except for acts [that are] committed in the course of a noninternational armed conflict in furtherance of the objectives of the
party to the conflict to which the person belongs and [that] do not
violate the norms referred to in subparagraph (B), an offense that
consists of homicide, assault with intent to commit serious bodily injury, kidnapping, serious unlawful detention, or an offense involving
the use of firearms .
if such use endangers a person other than the
offender;
(B)(i) an offense consisting of conduct which violates the provisions of subparagraph (1) of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and any Protocol additional thereto Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflict to
which the United States is a party."
This approach is first-rate. Subsection (B)(i), of course, should logically

House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on Aug. 3, 1983).
70. See American Bar Association, Report of the Section of InternationalLaw and
Practice, appended to ABA Report No. 104A (1983) [hereinafter cited as ABA Section Report.. The Proposed Amendmant- are Gct forth inT, ,clc,,ur A tn the .pction Report (Incl.
4). The report was drafted by the Section's International Criminal Law Committee under
the co-chairmanship of Waldemar A. Solf and James D. Clause.
71. ABA Section Report, supra note 70, at 6, para. c.
72. Id. at 12 n.6.
73. Id. at 78.
74. Id. at Incl. 4. See, e.g., Geneva Convention for the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, reprinted in 72 AM. J. INT'L. L. 457 (1978). A detailed discussion of the standards of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their relationship to the political offense exception, was attached to the ABA
Section Report as a separate inclosure (Incl. 3). That portion of the report is reprinted as
Appendix A to this article.
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be listed among the "absolute prohibitions" of Section 3194(e)(1), but the
idea is right on the mark. When combined with one other piece of the
definitional puzzle and with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's
interpretation of "extraordinary circumstances," the ABA proposal accounts for all of the situations that present hard cases or produce bad
results under the Castioni test.
Importantly, the ABA report recognizes the absence of a proportionality dimension to the Castioni test, stating:
The difficulty with the simple formula of the Castioni case is that it
did not recognize that there are limitations on the conduct of internal
armed conflict and that revolutionary violence which trangresses these
limitations is not tolerable under the political offenses exception.
Moreover, every political disturbance does not provide justification for
violent criminal acts."
This fundamental flaw in the prevailing test of a "relative" political offense would be remedied by reference to the normative humanitarian
rules established by 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocol II,
which prohibit murder, cruel or degrading treatment, hostage-taking, terrorism, and pillage directed at persons not, or no longer, taking an active
76
part in hostilities.
With the outer limit of conduct permissible under the political exception established by the first part of the ABA's proposed amendment,
there remains one other piece of the puzzle necessary for an acceptable
guideline: a definition of "non-international armed conflict" establishing
the lower limit or threshold for invoking the exception. The ABA's proposed amendment sets forth such a definition, and it is generally a satisfactory one. The ABA definition has two parts. First, it expressly excludes
certain situations from the definition stating that the term "armed conflict" does not apply to "situations of internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a
similar nature."' 7 This aspect of the definition is eminently correct, for
the purposes behind the political offense exception are not achieved by
applying the Castioni test to such situations. As the ABA report accom-

75. ABA Section Report, supra note 70, at Incl. 3.
76. Id. In support of its approach, the ABA quotes with approval the French extradition treaty which excludes from the political offense exception "acts committed in the
course of an insurrection or a civil war" that constitute "acts of odious barbarism and vandalism prohibited by the laws of war." Id. at 9. See also German Extradition Law of Dec.
23, 1929, which provides in part, "Extradition is permissible if the act constitutes a deliberate offense against life, unless committed in open combat." Harvard Research in Int'l. Law,
29 AM. J. INT'L L. 385 (Supp. 1935).
77. ABA Section Report, supra note 70, at Incl. 4. This provision is taken directly from
Article 1.2 of the 1977 Protocol II, 72 Am. J. Int'l L. 502, 503 (1978). The ABA explained
that the proposed amendment "uses the negative provisions of Protocol II to make certain
that acts of violence against the police of a State in situations falling short of 'armed conflict' do not benefit from the political offenses exception." ABA Section Report, supra note
70, at 7.
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panying the proposed amendment recognizes: "[T]errorist acts of violence
in situations falling short of armed conflict even when directed against
the security forces of a state, such as those perpetrated by the Red Brigade of Italy or the Bader-Meinhoff gang of Germany and similar groups
should . . . be excluded [from the exception] ."78
The second and most critical part of the definition in the ABA's proposed amendment is the positive portion defining the threshold for what
constitutes a "noninternational armed conflict." The model for the ABA's
definition is contained in article 1.1 of the 1977 Protocol II to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, which states:
This Protocol . . . shall apply to all armed conflicts . .. which take
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed
forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted
79
military operations and to implement this Protocol.
The ABA essentially adopted this definition but modified it slightly in
the proposed amendment, omitting the latter part which refers to dissident armed forces exercising "such control over a part of [the State's]
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations."80 For the sake of consistency and clarity, the entire definition from Protocol II should be built into the legislative guidelines. However, even if the ABA's definition is adopted in haec verba, the effect is
the same, for the proposed definition, just as the language in Protocol II,
plainly contemplates: "[s]ufficient statelike characteristics on the part of
the rebels, as to suggest a level of organization and violence to be found
in a classicial civil war, where one might expect international armed conflict rules to apply, either under recognized belligerence or a prudent expectation of reciprocity.""1 It is in precisely the circumstances of a "classical civil war," and only in those circumstances, that the theory of the
political offense exception embodied in Castioni and in the Ezeta decision in the U.S. should come into play. In such circumstances, and only
therein, does the rationale of those cases have validity. During a "classical

78.
79.
80.
entirety

ABA Section Report, supra note 70, at 8.
.
72 AM. J. INT'L L.502, 5 02-003.
,07001.
9
Including the excerpt set forth in the text at note 76, the ABA definition in its
states as follows:
(ii) for purposes of this subparagraph a non-international armed conflict
within the meaning of Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Convention shall
be an armed conflict which takes place within the territory of a foreign state
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other armed groups
which are under a command responsible to a party to the conflict for the conduct of its subordinates. The term "armed conflict" does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic
acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.
ABA Section Report, supra note 70, at Ind. 4.
81. Id. at 10.
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civil war" or revolution (such as in Lebanon, El Salvador, or Afghanistan), other nations should be able to avoid becoming embroiled in an
unstable internal dispute by extraditing c9mbatants, no matter whether
revolutionaries or tyrants, who have not breached the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the 1977 Protocol II. At the other end of the spectrum, where
no such condition pertains and where the forms of meaningful democratic
process exist, other nations should remain free to extradite those who use
violence to try to gain their goals despite the existence of other means of
redress. In the absence of civil war, political violence directed at governmental officials or security personnel should be deemed a "political offense" only in the "extraordinary circumstance" that no other means of
political redress is available. By enacting S.1940 with the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee's view of "extraordinary circumstances," with the
new absolute prohibition suggested above, and with the ABA's proposed
amendment, combatants in armed conflicts would be protected; mere terrorists would not.
The measure of the effect of this approach is to ask what would have
happened in McMullen and Mackin if the ABA amendments had been in
place. The answer is that the opposite results would have obtained, and
properly so. Much as the PIRA would like it otherwise, the "troubles" in
Northern Ireland do not constitute a civil war and do not justify invoking
the exception.
The political offense exception could never have been intended to
provide blanket immunity and asylum to every politically disaffected individual who in the company of a few others of like mind wishes to take
the law-and a gun-into his own hands. Where the institutions of democratic governance exist as they do, for example, in Northern Ireland, it illserves the interests of those who live in a free and open society to cast a
cloak of protection over impatient extremists who demand their own way
now and will kill anyone who stands in their way-whether policeman,
politician, soldier, or civilian. There is no rule of international law that
sanctifies political murder merely because the victim wears a uniform.
There is no open season on soldiers or policemen, nor should the city
streets and village lanes of a democratic nation be considered a war zone
merely because there are a hundred terrorists at large rather than one.
CONCLUSION

While the best approach is to defer to the Secretary of State in determining whether or not a particular crime is a "political offense" under our
extradition treaties, it appears that Congress has moved past this stage of
the argument. The decision to leave the matter in the courts' hands seems
irreversible; the task that is left is to provide more detailed guidance to
the courts in their interpretive task.
Section 3194(e) of S.1940, as passed by the Senate in 1982, provides
excellent guidance and would be entirely satisfactory if it is recognized
that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has set forth the correct
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standard for interpreting "extraordinary circumstances," if a new prohibition excluding terrorist attacks on civilians is added, and if the American
Bar Association's proposed amendment is adopted. Such a statute will
give courts the necessary tools with which to separate the truly downtrodden from the merely dissatisfied, to distinguish the rebel from the terrorist. By enacting such legislation, Congress will ensure that the balancing
of interests inherent in the political offense determination will be made
with a sense of proportion and in a manner consistent with our democratic notions of decency, world order, and the Rule of Law.
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Appendix A

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE:
Report to the House of Delegates/Inclosure 3.
EXTRADITION IN RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICT
1. The International Law rules applicable in armed conflict consist of
restraints formulated to prevent, or at least to mitigate, the destruction of
shared values occasioned by armed conflict. The underlying stimulus for
the development has been the realization that violence and destruction
which is unnecessary to actual military requirements is not only immoral
and wasteful of scarce resources, but also counterproductive to the attainment of the political objectives for which military force is used.
2. Breaches of the norms developed under customary and Conventional International Law are war crimes. The 1949 Geneva Conventions
designate certain aggravated breaches as universal and extraditable offenses within the criminal jurisdiction of each contracting party. As of
January 1, 1983, 152 nations are parties to those conventions.
Each of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions obliges the contracting
parties:
a. To enact any legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the
grave breaches defined therein.
b. To search for alleged offenders of such grave breaches, and to submit them for prosecution before its own courts, regardless of their nationality; or, in accordance with its own legislation, to extradite them to another contracting party concerned, provided the requesting party has
made out a prima facie case. (Common Articles 49/50/129/146).
As there are now 152 parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, grave
breaches denounced therein are universal crimes subject to the jurisdiction of each party to the conventions. They would be extraditable offenses, not subject to the political offenses exception, under the proposed
standard of S. 220(e)(1)(D) and H.R. 2643, Section 3194(e)(2)(D) which
prescribe that an offense with respect to which a treaty obligates the
United States to either extradite or prosecute a person accused of an offense is not a political offense.
c. The grave breaches defined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions are
the following, if committed in an international armed conflict against protected persons and objects:
in the case of all four Conventions: willful killing, torturing or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great
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suffering or serious injury to body or health;
in the case of the First, Second and Fourth Conventions: extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
in the case of the Third Convention: compelling a prisoner of war to
serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving him of the
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the Convention;
in the case of the Fourth Convention: unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected
person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or willfully depriving a
protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the
Convention; taking of hostages.
(Common Articles 50/51/130/147).
"Protected persons" within the meaning of the 1949 Geneva Convention are the wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons of the armed forces,
medical personnel, prisoners of war and civilians in the power of a party
to the conflict of which they are not nationals. (Fourth Convention, Art.
4).
3. The 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflict (Protocol I), adds several new offenses as grave breaches
including:
willful and unjustified acts of omissions which seriously endanger the
physical or mental health or persons in the power of an adverse party, by
medical procedures not indicated by the medical needs of that person, or
not consistent with generally accepted medical standards, including mutilations, medical experiments, and removal of organs for transplantation
(Protocol I, Art. 11(4));
willfully causing death or seriously injury to body or health by:
making the civilian population the object of attack;
launching an indiscriminate attack or an attack against works
or installations containing dangerous forces (dams, dykes, nuclear
electric power generating stations), knowing that it will cause civilian
casualties, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated;
making nondefended localities or demilitarized zones the
object of attack and;
the perfidious use of the Red Cross emblem. (Protocol I, Art. 85).
The United States has signed, but not ratified, the 1977 Protocols.
Protocol I is now effective as to twenty-seven states.
4. In international armed conflicts, prisoner of war status flows from
the combatants' privilege. Those who are entitled to the juridical status
of "privileged combatant" are immune from criminal prosecution for
those warlike acts which do not violate the laws and customs of war but
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which might otherwise be common crimes under municipal law. This is a
concept recognized by the classic publicists, including Belli, Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Vattel. It was recognized in Article 57 of the Lieber Instructions of 1863, which states that "[slo soon as a man is armed by a
sovereign government and takes the soldier's oath of fidelity, he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are not individual
crimes or offenses." Under the law of the United States, any killing while
on combat operations which is not violative of the laws of war is recognized to be justifiable homicide. Civil law courts recognized this concept
in the post-World War II trials when they provided immunity to those
defendants charged with violations of domestic criminal law if it was established that their acts were privileged under international law.
In view of the clear distinction between grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions and legitimate acts of combat by privileged combatants, the
standards developed in S. 220 and H.R. 2643 can be applied without difficulty as to acts of violence performed in the course of an international
armed conflict. Grave breaches are not political offenses; legitimate acts
of combat are not offenses at all and thus do not come within the scope of
extradition treaties.
5. Acts of violence occurring in the course of a non-international
armed conflict (insurrection, rebellion or civil war) pose a more difficult
problem. Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocol II
establish normative humanitarian rules applicable in non-international
armed conflict, they do not provide for any enforcement measures. Moreover, they do not oblige states affected by an internal armed conflict to
recognize the combatants' privilege or to accord prisoner of war treatment
to captured combatants of the other side. For self-evident reasons, governments (particularly those which may be affected by an emerging dissident or separatist movement) are unwilling to concur in any international
law which would, in effect, repeal its treason laws and confer on its domestic enemies a license to kill, maim or kidnap its security personnel
and destroy its security installations subject only to honorable detention
as prisoners of war until the conclusion of the internal armed conflict.
They fear that any international rule establishing the combatants' privilege and prisoner of war status in internal armed conflicts would tend to
encourage insurrection by reducing the personal risks of rebels. It follows
that within the scope of the domestic law of a country affected by such an
armed conflict, the rebels have committed treason and their acts of violence may be punished as common criminal offenses. As a matter of policy, States sometimes apply international armed conflict practices to a
civil war and are generous with amnesty in order to facilitate a restoration of peace, or in a prudent expectation of reciprocity, but international
law does not require such a policy except with respect to recognized belligerency, a rare event in this century.
6. Without affecting the legal status of the parties to a noninternational armed conflict, Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention
applies certain minimum human rights standards applicable to persons
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not, or no longer, taking an active part in the hostilities as follows:
ARTICLE 3.
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth
or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the abovementioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded, sick and shipwrecked shall be collected and
cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the
conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into
force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict.
These standards have been extensively elaborated and particularized
in the 1977 Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Relevant portions provide:
Article 4 - Fundamental guarantees
1. All persons who do not take a direct part or who have ceased to
take part in hostilities, whether or not their liberty has been restricted, are entitled to respect for their person, honour and convictions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction. It is prohibited to
order that there shall be no survivors.
2. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the following acts against the persons referred to in paragraph 1 are and shall
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remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever;
(a) violence to the life, health and physical or mental wellbeing
of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as
torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment;
(b) collective punishments;
(c) taking of hostages;
(d) acts of terrorism;
(e) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of
indecent assault;
(f) slavery and the slave trade in all their forms;
(g) pillage;
(h) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts.
Article 6 -

Penal prosecutions

1. This Article applies to the prosecution and punishment of
criminal offenses related to the armed conflict.
2. No sentence shall be passed and no penalty shall be executed
on a person found guilty of an offense except pursuant to a conviction
pronounced by a court offering the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality. In particular:
(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed
without delay of the particulars of the offense alleged against him and
shall afford the accused before and during his trial all necessary rights
and means of defence;
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offense except on the basis
of individual penal responsibility;
(c) no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense, under the law, at the time when it was committed; nor shall a
heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the
time when the criminal offense was committed; if, after the commission of the offense, provision is made by law for the imposition of a
lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby;
(d) anyone charged with an offense is presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law;
(e) anyone charged with an offense shall have the right to be
tried in his presence;
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to
confess guilt.
In addition to the foregoing, Protocol II includes standards for humane treatment of persons deprived of their liberty for reasons related to
the armed conflict (Art. 5); the care of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, (Arts. 7-12); and the protection of the civilian population against direct attack and other effects of hostilities (Arts. 13-18).
7. Because common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are the
Conventions' only articles relating to non-international armed conflicts,
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none of the provisions of the conventions relating to the enforcement, including the prosecute or extradite provisions are applicable to the norms
of Article 3. It follows that the only basis for extradition under U.S. law
for offenses violative of Art. 3 are the various bilateral extradition treaties
relevant to common crimes. These are subject to the political offenses exception. Indeed the political offenses exception was invented in 1840 for
the purpose of shielding from extradition the participants in the liberal
and nationalistic revolutions which occurred in mid-nineteenth century
Europe and the Americas.
8. Although there is no mandatory combatants' privilege and prisoner
of war status or treatment in internal armed conflicts within the scope of
any nation's municipal law, a qualified combatants' privilege has been
recognized by third states in matters relating to asylum and extradition.
The dichotomy between the state of municipal law and transnational
practice in this regard was vividly expressed by Sir James Stephen in his
explanation of the British Extradition Act of 1870:
[I]f a civil war were to take place, it would be high treason by levying
war against the Queen. Every case in which a man was shot in action
would be murder. Whenever a house was burnt for military purposes
arson would be committed. To take cattle ... by requisition would be
robbery. According to the common use of language, however, all such
acts would be political offences, because they would be incidents in
carrying on a civil war. I think, therefore, that the expression in the
Extradition Act ought (unless some better interpretation of it can be
suggested) to be interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to
be surrendered for extradition crimes, if those crimes were incidental
to and formed a part of political disturbances." (J. Stephen, A History
of the Criminal Law of England (1883), Vol II, at 70-71).
This reasoning was applied in the case of In re Castioni [1891] 1 Q.B.
149, 167 which became the leading influence on the application of the
political offenses exception in American courts. The difficulty with the
simple formula of the Castionicase is that it did not recognize that there
are limitations on the conduct of internal armed conflict and that revolutionary violence which transgresses these limitations is not tolerable
under the political offenses exception. Moreover, every political disturbance does not provide justification for violent criminal acts.
A 1907 French law comes much closer to the recognition of these limitations. it provided:
[Extradition is not granted] when the crime or offense has a political
character or when it is clear [resulte] from the circumstances that the
extradition is requested for a political end.
As to acts committed in the course of an insurrection or a civil war by
one or the other of the parties engaged in the conflict and in the furtherance ... of its purpose, they may not be grounds for extradition
unless they constitute acts of odious barbarism and vandalism prohibited by the laws of war, and only when the civil war has ended. (Law
of March 10, 1927, Tit. 1, Art. 5, para. 2, as quoted in Hannay, Inter-
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national Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 18 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 381, 386 (1979).
Similarly, the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (606
U.N.T.S. 267, 19 U.S.T. 6223) which prohibits the expulsion or return of
a refugee to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality or membership of
a particular social group or political opinion, does not apply to persons
with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has
committed a war crime or a serious nonpolitical crime (Arts. 2F, 33).
The gap between normative prohibitions and measures of enforcement in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its Protocols is plugged with
respect to hostage taking by the 1979 Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages. (Senate consent completed, but treaty not yet in effect).
Common Article 3 and Article 4 of Protocol II prohibit the taking of
hostages in a non-international armed conflict. Article 75 of Protocol I,
which lays down fundamental human rights for persons who do not qualify as "protected persons," also prohibits this act. But the grave breach of
the Fourth Convention applies only to "protected" civilians in the power
of an adverse party in an international armed conflict. The effect of Article 12 of the 1979 Hostage Convention, however, is to make the Hostage
Convention with its very strong prosecute or extradite provisions applicable to acts of hostage taking in armed conflicts, whenever the Geneva
Conventions and its Protocols do not establish the obligation to submit
[?] for prosecution or to extradite.
In view of the practice of states in regard to applying the political
offenses exception to normal combat activities occurring in a non-international armed conflict occurring in another country, the provision of S. 220
and H.R. 2643 which excludes all acts of violence from the benefits of the
exception, should be modified.
9. There remains for consideration, the issue whether a particular situation amounts to an armed conflict.
The 1977 Protocol II Applicable in Non-International Armed Conflict
has a very high threshold. Under Art. 1, that Protocol (which includes
rules regulating combat activities as well as basic human rights provisions) is applicable to armed conflicts:
...which take place in the territory of a high Contracting party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such
control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. (Protocol I, Art. 1(1)).
In view of the sophisticated provisions of Protocol II its implementation requires sufficient statelike characteristics on the part of the rebels
as to suggest a level of organization and violence to be found in a classical
civil war, where one might expect international armed conflict rules to
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apply, either under recognized belligerence or a prudent expectation of
reciprocity.
Protocol II also establishes a negative limitation which is relevant to
Common Article 3 (despite the express disclaimer that Protocol II does
not modify its existing application). Art. 1(2) provides: "This Protocol
shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar
nature, as not being armed conflicts."
The term "armed conflict" is not defined in Common Article 3,
mainly because no definition was able to command a consensus in the
1949 Geneva Conference. Presumably, in view of its basic minimum
human rights provisions it should be much lower than the threshold for
Protocol II. There is nothing in paragraph 1 of Common Article 3 which
is not already demanded by the procedure of penal law of "civilized"
states in relation to the treatment of common criminals.
Nevertheless, as the application of Common Article 3 acknowledges
the existence of an "armed conflict," many states have refused to admit
its application to insurgencies occurring in their territories. Thus, France
refused to apply Common Article 3 until late in the Algerian war; Pakistan denied its applicability to the Bengladesh secession. The U.K. has
never conceded that the troubles in Northern Ireland constitute an armed
conflict, despite its declaration, in justifying its derogation of certain provisions of the European Convention on human rights, that an emergency
exists threatening the life of the nation.
Insofar as foreign governments do not consider themselves bound to
refrain from applying the combatants' privilege as it applies to extradition cases involving violent acts occurring in an internal armed conflict, it
would seem that they are similarly not bound to follow the de jure government's determination as to whether an armed conflict exists for purposes of the political offenses exception.
The threshold article proposed for initial application (Incl. 4) consists of the minimum requirements that the dissident armed forces:
a. be linked to a party to the conflict;
b. be organized;
c. be under a command responsible to the party for the conduct of
subordinates, and;
d. that, the government's armed forces (rather than the civil police) be committed to suppress the insurrection.
It also uses the negative provisions of Protocol II to make certain
that acts of violence against the police of a State in situations falling
short of "armed conflict" do not benefit from the political offenses exception. The "extraordinary circumstances" clause, however, remains in the
draft proposal in order to allow courts to apply the exception to meritorious cases involving the use of violence in situations falling short of armed
conflict. The burden of establishing extraordinary circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence is on the person sought.

